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Abstract 
This article attempts to defend Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism (MC) 
from the trenchant criticism that it is as defective as radical communitarianism (RC) 
since they both fail to take rights seriously. As part of my response, I raise two critical 
questions. Firstly, I question the supposition in the literature that there is such a thing 
as radical communitarianism. I point out that talk of radical communitarianism is 
tantamount to attacking a “straw-man.” Secondly, I question the efficacy of the 
criticism that MC does not take rights seriously, given that there is no account of what 
it means to take rights seriously in the African tradition. This criticism, insofar as it 
does not specify a criterion of what it means to take rights seriously, remains 
defective. The central contribution of this article is to call our attention to the fact that 
the intellectual culture of rights will surely be affected by Afro-communitarianism, 
which emphasises our duties to all.  
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Introduction 
Professor Kwame Gyekye is one of the respected elders in African philosophy. He has made 
extensive contributions to moral-political philosophy in the African tradition. He is most 
famous for his defence of “moderate communitarianism” (MC). I understand MC as a 
normative political theory; it defends a consequentialist principle of right action grounded on 
the fundamental norms of the common good and dignity. This normative political theory is an 
attempt to proffer a plausible Afro-communitarianism that has a place for rights. MC is a 
response to what Gyekye considers an extreme form of communitarianism in the African 
tradition, which has no place for rights. He insists that a plausible communitarianism has to 
find a place for rights.  
 
This article offers a defence of Gyekye’s attempt (see Gyekye 1992; 1995; 1997; 2004; 2010) 
to include rights in the African tradition. Specifically, it argues that the salient criticism 
against MC—that it ultimately fails to regard rights as important, as does radical 
communitarianism (RC)—is not tenable. The essence of my defence is that Gyekye’s project 
is not meant to be the last word about the place of rights in the African context. A more 
charitable reading of Gyekye’s project will construe it as at best heuristic insofar as it is an 
attempt to integrate a liberal culture of rights into an Afro-communitarian ethos that prizes 
communal values. Specifically, Gyekye’s project is an invitation to Afro-communitarian 
scholars to embrace a global culture of rights. This inclusion of rights in African political 
thought surely is an ambitious, complicated and yet necessary moral-theoretical project. 
Gyekye’s submission is a call for a moderate stance that can find a dynamic balance between 
the demands of a communitarian ethos and the liberal regime of rights in light of the demands 
of modernisation and modernity. 
 
The Menkiti-Gyekye debate on moral-political theory, specifically whether a plausible Afro-
communitarian vision has a place for rights, has been at the heart of African philosophy for 
over 25 years (Metz 2012). Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984; 2004), a Nigerian philosopher, first 
articulated what he considered to be an African notion of “personhood.” Gyekye (1992; 
1995) responded by offering a trenchant criticism to Menkiti’s adumbrations on personhood 
by accusing him of defending a radical vision of communitarianism insofar as it does not 
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have a place for rights.1 Gyekye’s solution to RC, namely MC, has also been severely 
criticised in the literature. Here are some of the criticisms: 
 
 Anthony Oyowe (2014) deems Gyekye’s ontological account of a “self” to be 
implausible. 
 Metz (2012) finds approaching moral-political theorisation through the lenses of the 
Menkiti-Gyekye debate to be restricting the growth of political philosophy in the 
tradition; and he propounds a vision of rights grounded on the value of community. 
 Matolino (2009), Famanikwa (2010) and Oyowe (2014) criticise MC for failing to 
articulate an Afro-communitarian vision that reaches beyond the limitations of RC. 
They observe that Gyekye’s MC is not moderate at all; in fact, they observe that it is 
as radical as RC since it fails to secure the primacy of rights. It is against this criticism 
that the present article seeks to defend Gyekye’s MC.  
 
Several aspects are worth noting in this particular debate about the concept of “rights” in 
African philosophy. None of the scholars mentioned above seem to question the relevance 
and importance of rights in the African philosophical tradition.2 They all appear to share the 
moral intuition that rights ought to be a significant feature of a robust (African) political 
thought. It is, however, crucial for the reader to note that none of these scholars have 
adumbrated accounts to the effect of what it means to take rights seriously in the African 
tradition. The tendency, it appears, is to assume that rights ought to be taken seriously in the 
African tradition. The theoretical details and complexities inherent in specifying what it 
actually means to take rights seriously, are left unattended.  
 
Theorising and debating about rights where there is no prior theory sensitive and responsive 
to an African milieu about rights and their status, strikes me as problematic.3 This lack of 
theory about (the ontological status of) rights and what it means to take them seriously (in the 
African context) is even more concerning, given that there are some Western scholars who 
                                               
1  Recently, I have argued that Menkiti never advocated anything radical in his analysis of the notion of 
personhood (Molefe 2016).  
2  Even Menkiti (1984, 174) himself does not appear to reject rights per se; he simply relegates them to a status 
lower than that of duties.  
3  I consider that working with such an unclarified commitment to rights and what it means to take them 
seriously to be problematic, because anyone familiar with the literature on rights will know that scholars 
differ in their definition of moral rights. They also differ in terms of how to philosophically justify their 
existence and function in society and also in terms of why they are special (Donnelly 1982; Feinberg 1970; 
Sen 2004).  
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consider them to be spurious inventions of the enlightenment project (MacIntyre 1982). We 
also get historical reports to the effect that rights were absent to traditional Africa (Donnelly 
1982). So, the ontological assumptions about the existence of rights and what it means to take 
them seriously championed by my colleagues are not as obvious, at least to me as they are to 
them.  
 
This article defends MC by challenging the assumption that taking rights seriously in the 
African tradition will be the same as in the Western one. In other words, my aim is to defend 
Gyekye from criticisms by Matolino (2009), Famanikwa (2010) and Oyowe (2014) that 
accuse his analysis to amount to radical communitarianism. My argument is predicated on the 
assumption that when rights come into contact with the Afro-communitarian axiological 
orientation, they will surely be affected. It is in light of impact that happens to the culture of 
rights in Afro-communitarianism that Gyekye calls for a moderate version of 
communitarianism that has a place for both the common good and rights. The dynamic 
interplay between our duties to promote the common good and recognise the rights of 
individuals will tend to take the shape of a bent communitarianism, which emphasises the 
common good without jettisoning rights. 
 
I do not address myself to all the criticisms against MC in this article; I limit myself to the 
one that accuses it of amounting to the same conclusions as RC. What I wish to emphasise is 
that my defence of MC is not so much presented from the perspective of its commitment to 
rights as such, but rather from the perspective of its attempt to stimulate critical discussion of 
the normative force of rights in an African context. My submission is that Matolino (2009), 
Famanikwa (2010) and Oyowe (2014) err in their assumption that rights in Afro-
communitarian context ought to have the same normative status as they typically do in a 
Western context, where their peremptory status is taken to be almost absolute (Feinberg 
1970). 
 
To defend MC, I structure this article in the following fashion. In order to ground this 
deliberation, I briefly discuss Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism. I then consider 
Matolino (2009) and Famanikwa’s (2010) criticism of Gyekye’s MC.4 I offer three responses 
to this criticism. Firstly, I indicate that it is a “straw man” to believe that Menkiti ever 
                                               
4  I omit Oyowe largely because he makes similar observations made by these two scholars. 
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advocated RC. If Matolino’s argument is that Gyekye’s stance also amounts to RC, then it 
fails since Menkiti is no radical communitarian.5 Secondly, I explore the debate between 
radicals and moderates, and thirdly I submit that the unsubstantiated assumption that the 
normative force of rights will be the same—even in an African context—is problematic. I 
conclude this article by constructing what I consider to be the crucial contribution by Gyekye: 
his difficult task of unifying seemingly intractable values of rights and duties without 
necessarily aiming to be exhaustive with regards to issues of rights in Afro-
communitarianism. 
 
Moderate Communitarianism 
This idea of MC emerges as a response to what Gyekye calls an “unrestricted 
communitarianism” that is allegedly defended by Menkiti (1984; 2004), among others 
(Gyekye 1992). MC, as a moral-political theory, is a dualistic principle, which is grounded on 
two fundamental moral norms, namely: 1) the common good; and 2) dignity. The first norm, 
common good, grounds our duties to secure the wellbeing of all; the second, the idea of 
rights, captures the basic moral respect due to individuals as such.6 
 
The communitarianism that Gyekye (2004, 41) explicitly advocates makes the wellbeing (or 
welfare) of all people the most fundamental moral consideration. However, I argue that a 
more accurate and systematic articulation of Gyekye’s ethics demands of us to read Gyekye 
as taking the common good and dignity as chief goods; particularly when MC is under 
consideration. I say so because a careful consideration of Gyekye’s moral-political writings 
will notice a disjuncture between those that are dualistic insofar as they invoke the common 
good and dignity as primary moral values (Gyekye 1992; 1997); and one that is monistic 
insofar as it invokes wellbeing as the “master-value” (Gyekye 2004, 41). In this article, I limit 
myself to MC since it is the one under scrutiny in the literature. To begin unfolding MC, I 
will contrast it against RC, the view Gyekye is rebutting. 
 
“Radical communitarianism”, according to Gyekye (1992, 108), “is a view that gives an 
exaggerated conception of the community, wherein the community is construed as always 
                                               
5  I do not imply that African leaders, whom Gyekye accuses of advancing RC, also do not hold this view. I 
limit my comments to Menkiti.  
6  Gyekye takes a naturalist stance to rights (Donnelly 1982). In other words, he grounds rights in some 
understanding of human nature.  
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prior to the individual and this conception of the community fails to recognise the 
individuality of the individual and the rights that naturally belong to a human person insofar 
as a person is essentially autonomous.” He further states: “But here I want to point out that in 
as much as all the scholars referred to do not appear to have fully recognised the status and 
relevance of individual rights, their views patently model the notion of radical and 
unrestricted communitarianism” [own italics] (Gyekye 1997, 39). 
 
The project of defending MC is critical for Gyekye because it moves beyond merely stating 
that a community is an outstanding feature of an African culture; rather it aims to give a 
plausible conception of the role played by the community in the African moral and political 
philosophy. Among other things, at least, a correct conception of a communitarian ethics is 
that, Gyekye insists, it must recognise some of the goods that belong to an individual as such. 
Among these, he thinks the idea of dignity secures certain rights for the individual. The 
concern that Gyekye has against radical communitarianism is that it over-estimates the 
relevance and role of the community in its conception of a robust and just human society to 
the point where it perpetually promises to undermine the individual and her intrinsic worth. 
Gyekye’s defence of MC is, therefore, an attempt to balance this excessive emphasis on the 
community, to find a complex and dynamic balance between the individual and community. 
 
Moderate communitarianism counts as moderate inter alia because it opens room for 
individual rights. On this score, Gyekye says: 
 
The restricted communitarianism offers a more appropriate and adequate account of 
the self … in that it addresses the dual features of the self: as a communal being and as 
an autonomous, self-determining … (Gyekye 1992, 113) 
 
He also states: 
 
The view seems to represent a clear attempt to come to terms with the natural sociality 
as well as the individuality of the human person. It requires the recognition of 
communality and individuality … I think the most satisfactory way to recognize the 
claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of equal 
moral standing [own italics]. (Gyekye 1997, 41) 
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The analysis offered by Gyekye begins by submitting that a plausible Afro-
communitarianism must be characterised by a correct understanding of personhood. The 
notion of “personhood” can be ambiguous, it can be used ontologically or normatively 
(Ikuenobe 2006; Wiredu 2009). In this instance, Gyekye is somewhat after a philosophical 
anthropological account, which offers us an account of what features constitute human 
nature. Specifically, Gyekye understands human nature to be ontologically constituted by two 
features, namely: 1) the individualistic; and 2) communal properties.7 He further submits that 
a plausible African moral-political theory must reflect these defining features of a human 
nature. 
 
This dualistic conception of a human nature, constituted by individuality and sociality, 
informs Gyekye’s moral-political theory, which seeks to accommodate the social facets of 
human existence and the intrinsic value of each individual. A viable moral scheme, according 
Gyekye, must straddle its moral-theoretical corpus to negotiate and engage the tensions and 
potentials entailed by the simultaneous individuality and sociality of a human being to ground 
a more promising Afro-communitarianism. The social nature of a human person grounds the 
fundamental value of the common good; and individuality grounds the value of dignity, 
which in turn grants a person her rights. 
 
Gyekye operates on the basis of the assumption that political morality is a function of some 
ontological understanding of human nature. If human nature is constituted by the individual 
and social features, a viable moral theory must accommodate these facets of human nature. I 
proceed now to elucidate on the ideas of the common good and dignity that constitute 
Gyekye’s normative political theory. 
 
The “common good” is the idea that the “good of all determines the good of each or, put 
differently, the welfare of each is dependent on the welfare of all. This requires that the 
individual should work for the good of all, which of course includes her good” (Gyekye 
1995, 156). In another place, he states that “Such a good [common good] can be said to be 
commonly … shared by all human individuals, and to be essential for the ordinary or basic 
functioning of the human person in a human society” (Gyekye 2004, 54). He also observes 
that “communalism [teaches] that the individual can find the highest good—materially, 
                                               
7  Here, I say “somewhat” because Gyekye believes that these ontological properties are also morally valuable 
in the sense of recognition respect as adumbrated by Stephen Darwall (1977).  
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morally, and spiritually [psychologically]—in relationships with others and in working for 
the common good” (Gyekye 1995, 156, 158). In this sense, the pursuit of the highest good for 
a human being can be achieved by working for the common good. 
 
Furthermore, the notion of common good refers to the “basic goods that every individual 
person needs in order to function satisfactorily,” where promoting it is a matter of advancing 
such goods for everyone in the community (Gyekye 2004, 54). It follows then that individual 
self-realisation is contained in the promotion or working towards the common good. Thus, it 
is not surprising to read Gyekye as saying that “the community [common good] is a 
fundamental human good” [own italics] (Gyekye 1997, 67), or, as he puts it in another 
place—“the common good, then, is identical with human good” (Gyekye 2004, 57). 
 
Summing up, Gyekye’s conception of the common good is predicated on the following ideas. 
Firstly, Gyekye insists that we should understand that being human is something all human 
beings share in common. The human project, in this thinking, is a project that is common to 
all human beings. Secondly, to function properly or ordinarily as human beings, certain basic 
material, spiritual, political and psychological needs or conditions must be met. As such, his 
concept of the common good can best be explained by appeal to the idea of common basic 
human needs, that is, a basket of needs that must be met if a human being is to live a proper 
(ordinary) human life (Gyekye 2004, 41; 2010). In this sense, if these common needs are not 
met, one’s humanity is crippled and unfortunate. His ethical theory, therefore, implies that we 
are all morally obligated to help each human being to at least live in conditions that are 
suitable for her human life; to function ordinarily and even to flourish.8 In other words, we 
have other-regarding duties that are meant to assist each individual human being to lead a life 
of dignity, i.e. a life truly befitting a human person (Donnelly 1982). We can now turn to our 
discussion on the idea of dignity. 
 
The idea of “dignity” refers to that feature usually possessed by human persons in recognition 
of which they are all equally worthy of moral respect or rights (Darwall 1977, 33–34). 
Though Gyekye does not overtly commit to a particular conception of dignity, in some parts 
of his work he appeals to a supernaturalist conception of dignity (Gyekye 1992, 130); and, in 
                                               
8  Another useful way to make sense of this idea of the common good is by appeal to a Siamese crocodile with 
one stomach and two heads (Gyekye 2010; see also Wiredu 1992; 2009).  
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his naturalist moments, he grounds it on the autonomous nature of a self (Gyekye 1992, 130). 
But, to build his theory (MC) he grounds dignity on autonomy, a natural property. He avers: 
 
The capacity for self-assertion which the individual can exercise presupposes, and in 
fact derives from, the autonomous nature of the person. By autonomy, 
I … [mean] … having a will, a rational will of one’s own … it means, self-governing, 
self-directing … the actions emanate from his or her rationale will. (Gyekye 1992, 
112) 
 
In another place, he even goes to an extent of stating that “Autonomy must be a fundamental 
feature of personhood … Autonomy is, thus, valuable in itself” (Gyekye 1997, 54). In this 
reading, Gyekye is unequivocal that the property of autonomy which characterises a human 
being as such, is intrinsically valuable. Autonomy generally refers to one’s ability to self-
govern or rule. In other words, what makes a human being most valued in the natural realm is 
the fact that they can self-govern. On Gyekye’s thinking, individual rights are a moral 
package designed to ensure that we respect individuals in virtue of their abilities to self-
govern.  
 
Thus, I believe we have come to terms with Gyekye’s dualistic ethic that grounds morality on 
the basic values of the common good and dignity. We can reduce this political theory into the 
principle of right action: 
 
An action is right insofar as it maximally promotes [as a consequence] the common 
good without violating human dignity; and is wrong, if it does not maximally promote 
the common good and/or violates human dignity.9 
 
This principle as it stands, is grounded on our obligation to ensure the quality of life for all 
human beings—the common good; but in our quest to promote such a life, we should never 
trample the dignity of a human being. We can never promote the good of all human beings in 
ways that violate the dignity of some human beings. In this sense, dignity serves as a 
                                               
9  It is to be noted that Gyekye’s moral theory is consequentialist, that is, it requires agents to maximise a 
certain state of affairs (2010). 
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constraint (MacNaughton and Rawling 2006). Dignity also serves to ground rights. In this 
light, Gyekye (1992, 114) observes: 
 
Yet, the supposition that communitarianism will have no place or very little, if at all, 
for rights will be false … especially in the case of … moderate communitarianism. 
 
Gyekye unequivocally states that moderate communitarianism has a place for rights—and 
this place is a significant one—without implying that there are no limitations to rights within 
this Afro-communitarian system. 
 
Criticism of Moderate Communitarianism 
Bernard Matolino’s 2009 article, “Radicals versus Moderates: A Critique of Gyekye’s 
Moderate Communitarianism” and J. Famanikwa’s 2010 “How Moderate is Kwame 
Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism?” offer critical reflections to MC. Since these 
scholars make a more or less similar objection, I will mainly focus on Matolino to articulate 
the criticism. In his article, Matolino (2009, 161) intends to argue that “moderate 
communitarianism is not only inconsistent but not sufficiently different from radical 
communitarianism.” Famanikwa (2010, 65) also makes a similar observation that “The article 
also seeks to show that the gap which Gyekye claims exists between moderate … and 
unrestricted communitarianism is not as wide as he suggests.” Both these thinkers hold the 
position that MC is not different from radical communitarianism, or at least amounts to it. As 
such, their criticism questions MC’s attempts to secure rights as a fundamental role in 
African moral-political thought. To negate this promise of MC, Matolino (2009) attempts to 
demonstrate that MC is internally inconsistent insofar as Gyekye treats rights as things that 
can be set aside in certain circumstances. He demonstrates this inconsistency of MC by citing 
two assertions made by Gyekye. The first: 
 
With all this said, however, it must be granted that moderate communitarianism 
cannot be expected to be obsessed with rights. The reason, which is not far to seek, 
derives from the logic of the communitarian theory itself: it assumes a great concern 
for values, for the good of the wider society as such. The communitarian society, 
perhaps like any other type of human society, deeply cherishes the social values of 
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peace, harmony, stability, solidarity, and mutual reciprocities and sympathies [own 
italics]. (Gyekye 1997, 65) 
 
The second: 
 
Individual rights, the exercise of which is meaningful only within the context of 
human society, must therefore be matched with social responsibilities. In the absence 
of the display of sensitivity to such responsibilities, the community will have to take 
the steps necessary to maintain its integrity and stability. The steps are likely to 
involve abridging individual rights, which, thus, will be regarded by the moderate 
communitarian as not absolute, though important [own italics]. (Gyekye 1997, 65) 
 
With regards to the first quotation, Matolino (2009) observes that it plunges Gyekye in an 
inconsistency. On the one hand, Gyekye wants an account that takes rights seriously; but, on 
the other, he does not expect moral agents to be obsessed with rights. He further notes that if 
MC obsesses about socio-communal values then it is the same as radical communitarianism. 
With regards to the second quotation, Matolino (2009) is taken aback by the assertion that 
rights may be abridged if they undermine the communal good. 
 
This very possibility of rights being superseded by the common good, under certain 
circumstances, renders Gyekye as a radical communitarian, Matolino believes. Matolino 
(2009) is quick to remind us that Menkiti, whom Gyekye accuses of being a radical 
communitarian, does not necessarily reject rights per se; but simply gives them a secondary 
status relative to our duties and responsibilities to others. Thus, we can summarise Matolino’s 
criticism in this fashion. If MC does not regard rights as moral properties that we ought to be 
obsessed about; and if MC treats them as trump-able by our social duties to promote the 
common good, then it is not sufficiently different from radical communitarianism, which it 
seeks to reject and to serve as a viable alternative (Famanikwa 2010, 153–154). 
 
A Response to Criticism 
I offer a three-pronged response to Matolino’s criticism of MC. Firstly, I note that the major 
weakness of Matolino’s (2009) argument is that it assumes there is indeed a debate between 
what he refers to as “radicals” and “moderates,” as suggested by Gyekye in the African 
tradition (Matolino, 2009). Secondly, I submit that Matolino (2009), Famanikwa (2010) and 
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Oyowe (2014)  appear to be working on the assumption that Gyekye’s MC operates on the 
intuition that taking rights seriously is tantamount to considering them as having absolute 
normative force—a view I consider to be unattractive. Lastly, I will conclude the article by 
challenging these thinkers to imagine what happens to rights when they come into contact 
with an African moral culture that values community by way of promoting other-regarding as 
a way of life. 
 
The Debate between “Radicals” and “Moderates” 
The submission on rights by Gyekye makes sense if one already believes Menkiti (1984) had 
advanced a radical stance with regards to rights in his analysis of the notion of personhood. 
The literature has tended to assume that indeed Menkiti’s (1984) analysis manifests an 
extreme form of communitarianism, which has no place for rights. Matolino’s (2009) 
criticism and conclusion with regards to MC also seem to function on the assumption that 
Menkiti is a radical communitarian. Hence, the force and success of Matolino (2009), 
Famanikwa (2010) and Oyowe’s (2014) criticism depend crucially on the truth of Menkiti’s 
(2004) analysis of the notion of personhood ultimately leading to radical communitarianism. 
Remember Matolino’s (2009) conclusion is that there is no discernible difference between 
Menkiti and Gyekye with regards to rights; and, as such, both are instances of radical forms 
of communitarianism. But is it really true that Menkiti is a radical communitarian? 
 
I am personally not convinced that Menkiti’s (2004) analysis on personhood amounts to 
anything radical.10 Firstly, I advise the reader to note that Menkiti and Gyekye are actually 
analysing two distinct concepts of “personhood” in their elucidations of communitarianism. 
On the one hand, it appears that Menkiti (2004) is after the normative notion of personhood; 
whereas Gyekye (1992) is concerned with the ontological conception of a personhood, which 
is typical in the naturalist tradition of rights (Donnelly 1982). The “normative” notion of a 
person refers to the respect an individual human being earns relative to her performance in 
the moral arena (Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1992). The “ontological” notion identifies some facet 
of human nature that grounds respect due to all human beings merely because they possess 
the relevant descriptive properties like rationality. On the part of Gyekye, the relevant 
ontological properties constitutive of human nature are the social and autonomous nature of a 
human being, and the latter grounds rights (Darwall 1977). 
                                               
10 Elsewhere, I have defended this position at length (Molefe 2016). 
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It is crucial to note that the normative notion of personhood is not concerned about the 
question of human nature; it takes this for granted. It is concerned rather with what is to count 
as an ideal human life (Metz 2010). Here, African scholars draw a distinction between being 
merely human an invariable property—a biological category; and, being a person a variable 
property—a moral category (Menkiti 1984). The one is a fact of birth; and the other of 
performance. In Menkiti’s analysis, it is not enough to be merely human; one is expected to 
become a moral being, exuding excellences and virtues befitting a human life (Menkiti 1984). 
 
Another way to make sense of the normative idea of personhood is by appeal to Stephen 
Darwall’s (1977, 34) idea of “appraisal respect.” This idea refers to a kind of respect an 
individual earns relative to her moral performance. One thing to note is that this kind of 
respect is not due to every human being, it is a reserve of some human beings: those whose 
deportment embodies relational virtues prized by communitarianism like friendliness, 
hospitality, generosity, harmony, mutual aid and so on (Tutu 1999). 
 
That Menkiti is after the normative notion of personhood is not in dispute in the literature 
(Behrens 2013; Ikuenobe 2006; Metz 2010; Molefe 2016; Wiredu 1992; 2008; 2009). Wiredu 
comments rather approvingly on Menkiti’s analysis of the notion of personhood: he refers to 
it as the “locus classicus” and as “an article of superlative beauty” (Wiredu 2008, 17; 2009, 
16). He observes that Menkiti was the first one to articulate this notion of personhood in the 
African philosophical tradition, though it had been suggested by anthropologists in the 1940s 
(Wiredu 2009). Wiredu is unequivocal that he construes Menkiti’s talk of personhood to 
amount to a performance-based kind of a respect. In this regard, Wiredu avers: 
 
One major point of doctrinal disagreement is, actually, between the two editors of this 
volume, namely, Gyekye and myself. Gyekye in chapter 5: “Person and Community in 
Akan Thought” strongly disputes the view, advanced by a Nigerian philosopher 
Ifeanyi Menkiti, that personhood, as conceived in African thought, is not something 
one is born with but rather an ideal one may or may not attain in life. I happen to have 
independently arrived at basically the same view as Menkiti … (Wiredu 1992, 8) 
 
We observe that Menkiti is considered to be after the normative notion of personhood that is 
concerned essentially with assessing how moral agents conduct their lives, whether in ways 
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that produce virtuous or defective characters. Those human beings that do well are considered 
to be persons, a commending term; and, those that fail are blamed or frowned upon (Wiredu 
2009). It is, therefore, not presumptuous to register here that this notion of personhood does 
not seem to have any reference or connection to rights. 
 
In Gyekye’s case, however, the notion of personhood under analysis appears to be 
intrinsically connected with rights. Gyekye’s analysis of “personhood” can rightly be 
construed as belonging to a naturalist tradition of rights, wherein some descriptive human 
features are specified in virtue of which human beings are considered to be bearers of rights 
(Donnelly 1982b). This interpretation of Gyekye is suggested by this assertion: 
 
The restricted communitarianism offers a more appropriate and adequate account of 
the self … in that it addresses the dual features of the self: as a communal being and as 
an autonomous, self-determining … (Gyekye 1992, 113) 
 
Here, Gyekye is concerned with delineating features that constitute human nature. He 
understands human nature to be constituted by features of sociality and autonomy, and then 
he grounds the enterprise of rights on the human capacity for autonomy (dignity). It is to be 
noted that talk of rights invokes the kind of respect that belongs to all human beings qua 
human, regardless (all things being equal) of their moral conduct. One does not earn rights 
and one cannot lose dignity; dignity and rights are things a human being has merely because 
she is human (Toscano 2011). 
 
This brief analysis of these disparate notions of personhood in the debate between Menkiti 
and Gyekye is enough, I believe, to show that these two scholars are talking about two moral 
ways of thinking about value and respect. Menkiti’s notion imagines respect that tracks 
performance (conduct). Gyekye imagines respect that responds to human nature. It is safe to 
observe that these two thinkers are actually taking past each other insofar as they are talking 
to different notions of “personhood.” Further, Menkiti’s talk of personhood does not 
immediately appear to be related to rights. The notion (of personhood) that Gyekye has in 
mind is riveted on the naturalist tradition of dignity/rights. 
 
On the basis of these two disparate notions of personhood at play in the debate between 
Menkiti and Gyekye, it strikes me as philosophically questionable for Matolino (2009) to 
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simply assume that there was anything radical from Menkiti’s analysis of personhood. In fact, 
Wiredu, rather interestingly, notes: “I do not believe that Menkiti said anything extremely 
radical” (Wiredu in an interview with Eze and Metz 2016, 76). So, if there is nothing radical 
in Menkiti’s analysis of the agent-centred notion of personhood, how did Gyekye, Matolino 
and Famanikwa, among others, arrive at the conclusion that Menkiti advocated a radical 
version of communitarianism? 
 
If my analysis is true that Menkiti is no radical communitarian, then it seems that Gyekye’s 
and Matolino’s (2009) criticism is actually addressing a straw man. Moreover, if this is the 
case, it surely should follow that Matolino’s (2009) contention that Gyekye is as radical as 
Menkiti fails, since both are speaking to a straw man. I imagine that Matolino may here 
interject and suggest that I consider this assertion by Menkiti (1984, 180):  
 
In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to 
the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their 
exercise of their duties.  
 
Here, it is clear that Menkiti is ranking duties higher than rights; and it may, in light of this 
assertion, be reasonably supposed that he truly is a radical communitarian. So, here, Matolino 
may concede that Menkiti’s notion of personhood does not amount to radical 
communitarianism in and of itself. However, he may insist that Menkiti may be a radical 
communitarianism even without necessarily connecting this position to a particular 
conception of personhood. Menkiti’s assertion that rights take a secondary consideration to 
duties is enough to render him a radical communitarian. 
 
I submit that the mere fact that Menkiti regards rights as secondary in a communitarianism 
system does not necessarily imply that he is a radical communitarian. Such a case cannot be 
merely stated; it needs to be demonstrated, supposing one already has a theory that explains 
the place of rights in the African axiological system. Or, put differently, we can only say that 
Menkiti’s position is radical supposing we already have an account of what is to count as a 
proper or a moderate position. The criterion we have at our disposal, as suggested by Gyekye, 
does not warrant interpreting the priority of duties over rights to amount to radical 
communitarianism. 
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Such an interpretation will amount to overstating Menkiti’s position with regards to rights. 
The standard proffered by Gyekye defines what is to count as moderate. A moderate stance, 
according to MC, is one that balances or equalises duties and rights. It appears to be 
overreaching to label a position that relegates rights to a secondary status as radical. A radical 
position is one, I submit, that rejects rights entirely. But an account that accords rights a 
secondary status, in its axiological scale, should in all consistency and fairness be described 
as either limited or partial in its commitment to rights; but never radical. There must surely 
be a difference between an account that has no place at all for rights and one that gives rights 
a secondary status. 
 
Furthermore, I think there are progressive ways to construe Menkiti’s thinking about the 
secondary status of rights. It is possible that Menkiti is pointing us to the idea that Afro-
communitarianism offers an alternative vision for advancing the common good without 
necessarily rejecting or elevating rights to a higher status, as is common in Western political 
theories. This line of reasoning is more appreciable, given that Donnelly (1982, 307) informs 
us that the rights are foreign to Afro-axiological vision; in fact, he observes that Africans 
typically emphasised duties to secure a dignified life. So, if truly Menkiti is no radical 
communitarian then we can safely accuse Gyekye and Menkiti of being partialist and never 
radical communitarian.11 They both want rights to feature in the Afro-communitarian system, 
but it should not be the final arbiter in the pursuit of a dignified life. 
 
Normative Force of Rights 
I proceed to my second response to Matolino. In this part, I consider his unstated assumptions 
about the normative force of rights in the African context. Matolino’s (2009) accusation that 
MC is not different from radical communitarianism stems from the fact that rights are things 
that we ought not to obsess about or the fact that they may be set aside when they clash with 
the common good. It must be noted that in all fairness, Gyekye did not specify what it means 
to take rights seriously in Afro-communitarianism. Matolino (2009), Famanikwa (2010), 
Oyowe (2014) and others, so far as I am aware, do not tell us what it means to take rights 
seriously. Such a specification of the content of what it means to take rights seriously is 
crucial since it would have buttressed their criticism. In light of this theoretical content 
                                               
11  I trust that this enlightens the reader regarding the distinction between Menkiti’s partialism towards rights 
and Gyekye’s moderateness towards them. For Menkiti, rights are always secondary to duties. For Gyekye, 
rights, under certain circumstances may take a secondary status; but all things equal, rights are as 
fundamental as duties.  
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concerning what it means to take rights seriously, it appears to me that it is overreaching to 
accuse Gyekye of inconsistency when he admits of instances where rights might be set aside. 
Further, the view expressed by Gyekye that rights “are likely to be abridged [own italics]” is 
not as unattractive as Matolino (2009) makes it to appear. 
 
Note, in the Western moral-political tradition rights are taken to be at the heart of what is to 
count as a just or even a robust society—i.e., rights are taken seriously. The language 
employed to signify this important status occupied by rights is that they have a trumping 
property, thus they tend to take priority over other competing claims in the case of a clash. In 
other words, all things being equal, rights take priority over other social and moral 
considerations in the case of a trade-off (Sumner 2000, 289). This trumping property of rights 
is what makes them special in the Western tradition. 
 
However, many Western scholars do not take rights to be strictly absolute. They take rights to 
be relatively absolute; in other words, under most circumstances they will trump other 
competing moral and non-moral considerations (Donnelly 1982). Donnelly (1982, 395), 
informs us that there is a tendency to overstate the normative force of rights by representing 
them as strictly absolute. He continues to observe that “such a conception is neither 
defensible nor a necessary part of a natural rights theory” (Donnelly 1982, 395). Admitting 
that rights are relatively absolute appears to be cushioning Gyekye from being construed as 
treating rights as if they matter less. It is for this reason that he states: 
 
The steps are likely to involve abridging individual rights, which, thus, will be 
regarded by the moderate communitarian as not absolute, though important. (Gyekye 
1997, 65) 
 
In keeping with the sentiment shared by some scholars like Donnelly, Gyekye thinks that 
rights are important but they are not absolute—as some seem to think they are. In other 
words, there is nothing necessarily radical in imagining circumstances under which rights 
may be superseded by considerations of the common good. It is crucial to note that Gyekye 
does not explicitly assert that rights will always be set aside for the sake of the community. 
He uses a language that is not as stringent as his critiques would have us think; this is 
indicated by him merely stating the likelihood of their abridgement and not a necessity 
(Gyekye 1997). 
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Instead of accusing Gyekye of under-appreciating rights; the author contends that Gyekye 
(1997) reveals to us the complexity of an Afro-communitarian theory. MC has to balance 
both the potential and tension entailed by the dual norms that inform it, the good of all and 
the dignity of each individual. Whereas we have a duty to deliver conditions necessary for 
each human being to achieve an ordinary human life, we cannot do so by employing means 
that violate the dignity of human beings in the utilitarian style (Nozick 2002). The idea of 
dignity serves as crucial guiding and constraining norm in our quest to promote the good of 
each and every human being (MacNaughton and Rawling 2006). The same also applies to the 
idea of rights; whereas we have an obligation to take individuals’ rights seriously, this 
obligation is equally limited by what Gyekye (1997) refers to as the “stability and integrity” 
of the community—the concern goes both ways. In other words, dignity constrains what 
strategies and routes communitarians may employ to promote the common good; and, the 
good of all also constrains some individual rights, which may threaten the community and its 
continuance that is necessary for the exercise of rights. Unchecked obsession with the 
common good may threaten the dignity of individuals; and unchecked obsession with rights 
may threaten the good of all. The superlative beauty of MC is a function of its call for 
moderation; that is, a creative way to manage excesses inherent in obsessing about either the 
common good or rights. 
 
The foregoing reflection mainly focuses on the tension entailed by this dualistic moral-
political theory. The other side of this theory is its potential to enrich an Afro-communitarian 
axiological by recognising rights. It is to be noted that rights and the common good are not 
necessarily opposed, though they may be at times. In fact, rights and the common good are 
different approaches to securing a life of dignity. Rights refer to an individualistic regime for 
securing a dignified life by empowering an individual to claim or demand what she is entitled 
to (Feinberg 1970; Donnelly 1982). The common good refers to a regime of other-regarding 
duties and obligations that revolve around individuals to secure the wellbeing of all 
individuals (Gyekye 2004). If an individual is a being of dignity then certain ways of treating 
her are completely unacceptable and certain conditions/forms of a life do not correspond to 
her superlative value. Thus, Gyekye’s (2004) attempt to bring together these two visions of 
securing a life of dignity is daring and worth unpacking for both the tensions and potential it 
promises. Instead of appreciating this dynamic tension created by the complexity of social 
life and individuality that may pit rights against duties, colleagues merely see a theoretical 
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inconsistency. The author contends that Gyekye’s (2004) account offers a daring integration 
of rights and duties that does not shy away from dynamic tensions which are intrinsic in any 
moral regime that attempts to account for a life of dignity. 
 
Another useful way to think about the tension and potential entailed in this integration of 
rights and the common good, is in terms of an analogy of a continuum. Rights are at the left 
end of the continuum and the common good on the other. We must bear in mind, however, 
that when we say some communities are individualistic and others are communitarian, we are 
only talking in degrees (Gyekye 1997; Wiredu 2008). No society is completely individualistic 
and no society is completely communitarian. The reason for this is because both facets are 
necessary and crucial for facets of human existence. 
 
There are certain pitfalls to a society that is overly communitarian. It may be authoritarian; it 
may choke individuality, uniqueness, innovation and creativity, which are crucial for 
advancing a robust individual life and a healthy community. Gyekye (2004) emphasises the 
facet of autonomy to capture the fact that it is individuals’ will, exertion/effort, courage and 
perseverance that bring about civilisations and progress in societies. Equally, there are certain 
pitfalls associated with unrestricted individualism. Some people are more talented than 
others, more socially connected than others and have a history of privilege more than others. 
If the wellbeing of individuals is left in the hands of each individual’s self-interest, then some 
people’s lives may be seriously handicapped. Communitarianism, therefore, addresses these 
limitations by emphasising social relationships laden with other-regarding duties. 
 
The continuum model is an attempt to balance these two facets of moral-political thought 
without shying away from the point of departure being communitarian. Hence, Gyekye will 
go to the trouble of pointing out that in the moderate communitarian scheme, there won’t be 
an obsession with rights, but that does not render them less important. In other words, though 
moderate communitarianism is located somewhere in the middle of the continuum, where 
individualism and communitarianism meet; in the case where things are not equal, however, 
the political system will tilt towards the community taking priority only to self-correct and 
then tilt to its equalising position in the continuum. This is a more promising interpretation of 
Gyekye, I submit; and it must appreciate this dynamic interplay that I suspect is inherent in 
his analysis. 
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I conclude this article by registering my last concern that those who criticise Gyekye appear 
to overlook certain aspects in their criticism. I will also motivate why we must take Gyekye’s 
moderate communitarianism seriously. 
 
Rights in the Afro-communitarian Context 
One of the surprising facets of the criticism offered by Matolino (2009), Famanikwa (2010) 
and Oyowe (2014), is that they do not expect rights to be affected by an African axiological 
system that prioritises the good of all as the point of departure. This is surprising, given that 
scholars of rights have insisted that though rights are universal they are not so stringent as not 
to be affected by varying particular contexts in which they have to be practised and realised 
(Cobbah 1987; Deng 2004). Why can’t it be a viable possibility that rights in the African 
axiological tradition may lose some of their normative force in certain contexts where they 
clash with some of the high ranking goods in the Afro-communitarian cultural context? Why 
should a possibility of rights losing some normative force in the African context be 
considered radical?  
 
The very edifice of communitarianism engenders a particularly other-regarding moral attitude 
captured by the idea of “personhood” (Gyekye 1997; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1992). The idea 
of personhood does not deny that human beings have dignity. In fact, human beings are 
thought to be characterised by a divine spark, Okra, in virtue of which they deserve an 
ineliminable minimum respect (Gyekye 1992; Shutte 2001; Wiredu 2009). A human being is 
expected to realise the ideal life befitting a human being and she can only achieve such a 
status by exercising duties to others, by way of promoting the good of all (Molefe 2017; 
Wiredu 2008). This very idea of personhood that corresponds with other-regarding duties and 
obligations implied by the idea of the common good, surely should have an impact on how 
rights ought to be imagined and practised in this tradition. It is this reflection between the 
interplay of a human being as a bearer of rights and a bearer of duties that has not been fully 
explored, which the author contends is at the heart of the contribution of MC. 
 
The moral-theoretical contribution that Gyekye (2004) makes is a sophisticated one and 
should be criticised with this understanding. It is both practical and theoretical. Practically, 
Gyekye is burdened by widespread violation of human rights in Africa (Gyekye 1992, 104). 
He is also equally alive to the fact that rights are now adopted as a measure of civilisation and 
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a good life (Gyekye 1992, 104). Moreover, he is cognisant that Africa is not in a position 
where it can simply ignore or reject rights wholesale—given the unfortunate history of 
colonialism that connects us to the West and how foreign aid also comes with rights as part of 
the “aid” (Ake 1987, 5–6). These practical considerations impel African scholars to think 
about the important place that rights should have in an African context. 
 
Theoretically, Gyekye is equally concerned by “unbridled individualism” that characterises 
the culture of rights (Metz 2007, 326). He is aware that rights have a tendency to threaten 
group-morality, which is a distinctive feature of Afro-communitarianism (Gyekye 1992, 
101). Rights have a tendency to undermine “the vitality of all groups that held an 
intermediate position between the individual and the state: the sovereignty of the state and the 
sovereignty of the individual” (Cobbah 1987, 315). Moreover, should we leave matters to the 
sovereignty of the individual and the state unchecked, we would have threatened the very 
paramount African-communitarian project of at least securing the basic needs necessary for 
ordinary functioning of each and every individual (Cobbah 1987, 314; Gyekye 2004, 99). 
 
Hence, Gyekye’s thesis that attempts to equalise rights and duties is born out of these 
practical and theoretical considerations. Therefore, criticism of Gyekye must imagine the 
difficulty of marrying these two together. Generally, criticism of MC does not fully 
appreciate these considerations. 
 
Conclusion 
This article set itself the task of defending MC as a progressive moral-theoretical attempt to 
philosophically include and defend rights as a plausible feature of Afro-communitarianism. I 
formulated a response against the criticism that MC is ultimately no different from RC in its 
failure to embrace the culture of rights. Central to my argument was the idea that MC offers a 
creative way to accommodate rights in the Afro-communitarian milieu, without 
compromising the group-morality characteristic of African moral thought. I believe it is 
crucial for literature concerned with the topic of rights in African philosophy to think about 
the criticism made against MC. Is it the case that MC is rejected because it is not a plausible 
attempt to introduce rights in Afro-communitarianism? Or, is it rejected because rights ought 
not to feature in Afro-communitarianism? In this article, I have demonstrated that MC offers 
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a promising way to think about rights. I have challenged the literature to seriously reflect 
about the place and relevance of rights, taking a cue from moderate communitarianism. 
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